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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Stanley appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania denying his motion to suppress evidence 
that he was in possession of child pornography.  
Specifically, Stanley argues that a Pennsylvania State 
Police officer conducted a warrantless search when he 
used a device called the “MoocherHunter” to trace 
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Stanley’s wireless signal from a neighbor’s unsecured 
wireless router to its source inside Stanley’s home.  For 
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the use of the 
MoocherHunter was not a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.
1
   
I. 
On November 11, 2010, Corporal Robert Erdely 
(“Erdely”), the head of the computer crime unit of the 
Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), was investigating the 
online distribution of child pornography when he 
discovered a computer on the Gnutella peer-to-peer 
network
2
 sharing 77 files that he suspected contained 
child pornography.  Based on information available to 
any Gnutella user, Erdely determined that this computer 
was using file-sharing software with a globally unique 
identification number of 
“8754E6525772BA0134C4C6CACF12E300” (“300 
GUID”) and was connected to the Internet via an Internet 
                                                 
1
  Judge Shwartz joins Parts I through IV.A of this 
Opinion. 
2
  Peer-to-peer networks allow users to share files by 
connecting to other individual computers directly, without 
using a centralized administrative system.  Gnutella is a 
particularly large peer-to-peer network and is utilized by a 
number of popular file sharing programs.  
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protocol address (“IP address”) of “98.236.6.174” (“174 
IP Address”).   
Through a search of publicly available records, 
Erdely determined that the 174 IP Address was registered 
to a Comcast Cable (“Comcast”) subscriber, and he 
obtained a court order requiring Comcast to disclose this 
individual’s subscription information.  In response, 
Comcast informed Erdely of the subscriber’s name (“the 
Neighbor”) and his home address in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
On November 18, 2010, Erdely executed a search 
warrant for the Neighbor’s home.  The search revealed 
that none of the Neighbor’s computers contained either 
child pornography or the file-sharing software with the 
300 GUID.  The search also revealed that the Neighbor’s 
wireless Internet router was not password-protected.  
From this information, Erdely deduced that the computer 
sharing child pornography was connecting wirelessly to 
the Neighbor’s router from a nearby location without the 
Neighbor’s knowledge or permission.3  In other words, 
                                                 
3
 To establish a wireless connection, an Internet user 
selects the desired wireless network from a list of available 
options displayed on his wireless-enabled device.  This causes 
a wireless card inside the user’s device to transmit radio 
waves to the wireless router, which then transmits radio 
waves back to the device.  This exchange of radio waves 
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Erdely determined that the computer in question was 
“mooching” off the Neighbor’s Internet connection. 
With the Neighbor’s permission, Erdely connected 
a police computer to the router in order to determine the 
media access control address (“MAC address”) and 
private IP address of any other devices that were 
connected wirelessly at the time.
4
  From this data, Erdely 
determined that the mooching computer was not 
connected at that time.  With the Neighbor’s permission, 
Erdely left the police computer attached to the router so it 
could be accessed remotely from Erdely’s office in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.   
On January 19, 2011, while working in Harrisburg, 
Erdely learned that the computer associated with the 300 
GUID was again sharing child pornography on the IP 
address assigned to the Neighbor.  By remotely accessing 
the police computer he had left in the Neighbor’s home, 
Erdely determined that the mooching computer had a 
private IP address of “192.168.2.114” (the “114 Private 
IP Address”) and a MAC address of “mac=00-1C-B3-
B4-48-95” (the “95 MAC Address”).  Erdely searched 
online for the “mac” prefix in the 95 MAC address and 
discovered that it belonged to an Apple wireless card.  
                                                                                                             
comprises the “wireless signal” that connects the device to the 
router. 
4
 This information was available to any computer 
connected to the Neighbor's router. 
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Because Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless 
devices in the Neighbor’s home, this information 
reinforced his conclusion that the 95 MAC Address and 
the 114 Private IP Address belonged to the mooching 
computer.  Erdely decided to travel to Pittsburgh so that 
he could use a “MoocherHunter” device to attempt to 
determine this computer’s location.    
The aptly-vernacularized MoocherHunter is a 
mobile tracking software tool that can be downloaded for 
free from the manufacturer’s website and used by anyone 
with a laptop computer and a directional antenna.
5
  This 
device can be used in either “active mode” or “passive 
mode.”  In “passive mode,” the user enters the MAC 
address of the wireless card he wishes to locate and the 
program measures the signal strength of the radio waves 
emitted from this card.
6
  These signal strength readings 
increase as the user aims the antenna in the direction of 
the mooching computer and moves closer to its location.  
Before using the MoocherHunter, Erdely contacted 
an Assistant United States Attorney in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania to discuss the propriety of 
                                                 
5
  Though MoocherHunter is the name of the software, 
for the sake of convenience this opinion will refer to this 
software and the equipment using it collectively as “the 
MoocherHunter.” 
6
  The mechanics of “active mode” are not relevant to 
this appeal.   
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obtaining a search warrant.
7
  Erdely and the AUSA had a 
“lengthy discussion” in which they decided that the 
MoocherHunter was “completely different” from the 
infrared technology used in Kyllo v. United States, 537 
U.S. 27 (2001).  J.A. 271.  They also discussed the 
practical impossibility of obtaining a search warrant 
without knowing which one of the many nearby 
residences the signal was being transmitted from.  
Ultimately, Erdely determined that he needed to proceed 
without a warrant. 
On the evening of January 19, 2011, Erdely arrived 
at the Neighbor’s home and entered the 95 MAC Address 
into the MoocherHunter.  From the residence, he found 
that the MoocherHunter’s readings were strongest (67) 
when he aimed the antenna at a six-unit apartment 
complex across the street.  From the public sidewalk in 
front of this building, the MoocherHunter’s readings 
were strongest (100) when Erdely aimed the antenna 
directly at Stanley’s apartment.   
That night, Erdely used this information to obtain a 
search warrant for Stanley’s home.  Shortly thereafter, 
Erdely and other PSP officers executed this warrant.  
When these officers arrived, Stanley initially fled through 
a back door.  He soon returned, however, and confessed 
                                                 
7
  Ederly reached out to the AUSA after unsuccessfully 
attempting to contact an attorney at the Allegheny County 
District Attorney’s Office.  
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that he had connected to the Neighbor’s router to 
download child pornography.  Erdely seized Stanley’s 
Apple laptop and later recovered 144 images and video 
files depicting child pornography. 
II. 
 As a result of Erdely’s meticulous investigation, a 
federal grand jury in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania returned a one-count indictment charging 
Stanley with possession of child pornography in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  Stanley was arrested and 
initially pled not guilty. 
 On April 13, 2012, Stanley filed a motion to 
suppress his statements to Erdely and the evidence 
obtained from his home and computer.  His primary 
argument was that Erdely conducted a warrantless search 
under Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), when 
he used the MoocherHunter to obtain information about 
the interior of his home that was unavailable through 
visual surveillance.
8
 
 On November 14, 2012, the District Court denied 
Stanley’s motion.  Citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
                                                 
8
  Stanley also argued that Erdely’s search warrant was 
not supported by probable cause and that the MoocherHunter 
was a “mobile tracking device” which required a warrant 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3117.  He has abandoned these arguments 
on appeal. 
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735 (1979), the District Court held that Stanley lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his wireless signal 
because he “exposed his wireless signal to a third party 
and assumed the risk that the signal would be revealed to 
authorities.”  J.A. 23.  The District Court also rejected 
Stanley’s Kyllo argument, explaining that “although the 
defendant [in Kyllo] caused the heat by using high-
intensity lamps, he did not send it to a third party and to 
the extent he could, he contained the heat in his garage.”  
Id. at 27.  Stanley, on the other hand, “had to . . . initiate 
contact” with the Neighbor’s router and therefore “did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
wireless signal simply because it emanated from a 
computer located inside of his home.”  Id.  Finally, the 
District Court noted that if Stanley had shared child 
pornography through his own Internet subscription, 
Erdely could have discovered his location the same way 
he discovered the Neighbor’s: by subpoenaing his 
Internet service provider for subscription information.  
Id. at 28.  “That [Stanley] established an unauthorized 
connection,” the District Court reasoned, “does not 
convert his subjective expectation of privacy into a 
reasonable one.”  Id.   
 Thereafter, Stanley entered into an agreement with 
the government, under which he would plead guilty but 
reserve the right to appeal the District Court’s order 
denying his motion to suppress.  After his guilty plea was 
entered, the District Court sentenced Stanley to 51 
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months in prison.  This timely appeal followed.   
III. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“With respect to a suppression order, we review 
the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and 
exercise plenary review over its legal determinations.”  
United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(internal citations omitted). 
IV. 
“There are two ways in which the government’s 
conduct may constitute a ‘search’ implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 2012).  First, a search 
occurs when the government “unlawfully, physically 
occupies private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.”  Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 
S.Ct. 945, 949–52 (2012)).  Alternatively, a search occurs 
when the government violates an individual’s expectation 
of privacy that “society recognizes as reasonable.”  Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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Stanley does not contend that Erdely physically 
trespassed on his property at any point during his 
investigation.  Nor would that argument have been 
successful; Erdely did not physically enter Stanley’s 
property until after he obtained a search warrant for the 
apartment.  Instead, Stanley argues that Erdely violated 
his reasonable expectation of privacy when he used the 
MoocherHunter to trace Stanley’s wireless signal back to 
the interior of his home. 
 
Determining whether this second type of search 
occurred involves two questions: “(1) whether the 
individual demonstrated an actual or subjective 
expectation of privacy in the subject of the search or 
seizure; and (2) whether this expectation of privacy is 
objectively justifiable under the circumstances.”  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 543.  To be objectively 
justifiable, a defendant’s expectation of privacy must be 
more than rational; society must be willing to recognize it 
as legitimate.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 122 (1984) (“The concept of an interest in privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by 
its very nature, critically different from the mere 
expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will 
not come to the attention of the authorities.”); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Obviously, 
however, a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by 
definition means more than a subjective expectation of 
not being discovered.”). 
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A. 
 The thrust of Stanley’s argument on appeal is that 
Erdely’s use of the MoocherHunter was an unlawful 
search under Kyllo.  We disagree, and hold that Stanley’s 
expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared 
to recognize as legitimate.
9
 
 
In Kyllo, police officers suspected that the 
defendant was growing marijuana inside of his home.  
533 U.S. at 29.  Without obtaining a warrant, these 
officers parked across the street and scanned the 
defendant’s home using a thermal imager.  Id. at 29–30.  
This device revealed that certain portions of the home’s 
exterior were unusually warm, leading police to believe 
that the defendant was using high-powered halide lamps 
inside.  Id. at 30.  The Supreme Court held that this scan 
was a search, and established a rule that “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding 
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area constitutes a search—at 
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in 
                                                 
9
 The Government argues that Stanley did not proffer 
any evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy.  Because 
we find that any such expectation would not have been 
objectively justifiable, we need not reach the question of 
whether Stanley adequately demonstrated that he subjectively 
held it. 
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general public use.”  Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 
One could argue that this language, considered in 
the abstract, encompasses Erdely’s use of the 
MoocherHunter.  The MoocherHunter, like the thermal 
imager in Kyllo, is surely “sense-enhancing technology,” 
as it detects radio waves which cannot be perceived by 
unaided human senses.  Further, Erdely used this sense-
enhancing technology to obtain “information regarding 
the interior of [Stanley’s] home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion”: the fact 
that a wireless card associated with particular Internet 
activity was located there.  Id.  See also United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–18 (1984) (holding that the 
government’s use of a tracking device to discover that a 
particular barrel was located inside the defendant’s home 
was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).  
Finally, the government does not contend that the 
MoocherHunter is technology that is “in general public 
use.”   
Critical to Kyllo’s holding, however, was the fact 
that the defendant sought to confine his activities to the 
interior of his home.  He justifiably relied on the privacy 
protections of the home to shield these activities from 
public observation.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 
(characterizing the thermal imaging scan as a “search of 
the interior of [Kyllo’s] home[],” which it considered to 
be “the prototypical . . . area of protected privacy”).  See 
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also id. at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details 
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe 
from prying government eyes.”) (emphasis in original).  
Stanley can make no such claim. 
 
Stanley made no effort to confine his conduct to 
the interior of his home.  In fact, his conduct—sharing 
child pornography with other Internet users via a 
stranger’s Internet connection—was deliberately 
projected outside of his home, as it required interactions 
with persons and objects beyond the threshold of his 
residence.  In effect, Stanley opened his window and 
extended an invisible, virtual arm across the street to the 
Neighbor’s router so that he could exploit his Internet 
connection.  In so doing, Stanley deliberately ventured 
beyond the privacy protections of the home, and thus, 
beyond the safe harbor provided by Kyllo.  See United 
States v. Broadhurst, No. 3:11-cr-00121-MO-1, 2012 
WL 5985615, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012) 
(distinguishing the use of a MoocherHunter-like device 
from the thermal scan in Kyllo because “in Kyllo, the heat 
signals were not being intentionally sent out into the 
world to connect publicly with others.”); United States v. 
Norris, No. 2:11-cr-00188-KJM, 2013 WL 4737197, at 
*7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013) (“In this case the agents used 
Moocherhunter to pick up signals the defendant was 
voluntarily transmitting to [his neighbor’s router], not 
information confined to the private area of defendant’s 
home.”).  
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Stanley cannot avail himself of the privacy 
protections of his home merely because he initiated his 
transmission from there.  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 
(“The fact that [Smith] dialed the number on his home 
phone rather than on some other phone could make no 
conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber 
rationally think that it would.”).  Most importantly, while 
Stanley may have justifiably expected the path of his 
invisible radio waves to go undetected, society would not 
consider this expectation “legitimate” given the 
unauthorized nature of his transmission.  Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 143 n.12.   
 
As noted in Rakas, “[a] burglar plying his trade in 
a summer cabin during the off season may have a 
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, 
but it is not one which the law recognizes as 
‘legitimate.’”  Id.  The defendant’s presence in those 
circumstances “is wrongful; his expectation is not one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Similarly, in United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 165 
(3d Cir. 2011), we held that an unauthorized driver in a 
rental car lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle in part because he “not only acts in contravention 
of the owner’s property rights, but also deceives the 
owner of the vehicle.”  
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Here, the presence of Stanley’s unauthorized 
signal was itself “wrongful.”  When Stanley deliberately 
connected to the Neighbor’s unsecured wireless network, 
he essentially hijacked the Neighbor’s router, forcing it to 
relay data to Comcast’s modem and back to his 
computer, all without either the Neighbor’s or Comcast’s 
knowledge or consent.  Stanley was, in effect, a virtual 
trespasser.  As such, he can claim no “legitimate” 
expectation of privacy in the signal he used to effectuate 
this trespass—at least where, as here, the MoocherHunter 
revealed only the path of this signal and not its contents.  
   
The presence of Stanley’s signal was likely illegal.  
A large number of states, including Pennsylvania, have 
criminalized unauthorized access to a computer 
network.
10
  A number of states have also passed statutes 
penalizing theft of services,
11
 which often explicitly 
                                                 
10
  See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 502; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18-5.5-102; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 932; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
815.06; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-2-3; Iowa Code Ann. § 
716.6B; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:73.8; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
569.099; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 638:17; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:20-25; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1953; S.C. Code Ann. § 
16-16-20; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 7611; Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 33.02; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4102; W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 61-3C-5. 
11
  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-8-10; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13-1802; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 845; 720 ILCS 5/16-14; 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514.060; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-305; 
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include telephone, cable, or computer services.
12
  We 
need not decide here whether these statutes apply to 
wireless mooching,
13
 but the dubious legality of Stanley’s 
conduct bolsters our conclusion that society would be 
unwilling to recognize his privacy interests as 
“reasonable.”  This is particularly so where the purpose 
                                                                                                             
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 637:8; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-8; 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3926; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409.3; 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2582.   
12
  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1801; Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 857; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-8; Or. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 164.125; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.56.010; 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3926.  See also Alaska Stat. Ann. § 
11.46.200 (“A person commits theft of services if . . . the 
person obtains the use of . . . a computer network . . . with 
reckless disregard that the use by that person is 
unauthorized.”); Iowa Code Ann. § 714.1 (“A person 
commits theft when the person . . . [k]nowingly and without 
authorization accesses . . . a . . . computer network . . . for the 
purpose of obtaining computer services.”). 
13
  Some commentators consider the legality of wireless 
mooching to be an open question. See, e.g., Grant J. Guillot, 
Trespassing Through CyberSpace; Should Wireless 
Piggybacking Constitute a Crime or Tort Under Louisiana 
Law?, 69 La. L. Rev. 389, 399 (2009); Benjamin D. Kern, 
Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of WI-
FI and the Law, 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 
101, 145 (2004); Matthew Bierlein, Note, Policing the 
Wireless World: Access Liability in the Open Wi-Fi Era, 67 
Ohio St. L.J. 1123, 1165 (2006). 
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of Stanley’s unauthorized connection was to share child 
pornography.
14
 
 
To recognize Stanley’s expectation of privacy as 
“legitimate” would also reward him for establishing his 
Internet connection in such an unauthorized manner.  As 
the District Court recognized, had Stanley shared child 
pornography using his own, legitimate Internet 
connection, Erdely could have obtained Stanley’s address 
from his Internet service provider—just as he obtained 
the Neighbor’s address from Comcast.  See United States 
v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Federal courts have uniformly held that subscriber 
information provided to an internet provider is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy 
expectation.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Stanley cannot conceal his location by 
establishing an unauthorized connection and at the same 
time ask society to validate his expectation of privacy in 
the signal-strength information that police used to 
determine that location in a more roundabout manner.  
See Broadhurst, 2012 WL 5985615 at *5 (refusing to 
allow the defendant to “serendipitously receive Fourth 
Amendment protection because he hijacked another 
person’s Internet connection to share child pornography 
                                                 
14
  Cf. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:73.8 (penalizing 
“accessing . . . of any . . . computer network . . . for purposes 
of uploading, downloading, or selling of pornography 
involving juveniles”). 
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files”).   
Although the analogy is imperfect, we believe that 
the MoocherHunter is akin to a drug sniffing dog in that 
it was only able to detect a signal that was itself 
unauthorized and likely illegal.  The use of a drug 
sniffing dog, which allows police to detect odors that 
they could not perceive with their human senses, is not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because it 
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 
contraband item.”  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
707 (1983).  See also id. (“[A drug sniffing dog] does not 
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain 
hidden from public view, as does, for example, an 
officer’s rummaging through the contents of the 
luggage.”).  In this way, “the manner in which 
information is obtained through this investigative 
technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.”  
Id.  Thus, “[t]he legitimate expectation that information 
about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is 
categorically distinguishable from [a defendant’s] hopes 
or expectations concerning the nondetection of 
contraband.”  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 
(2005).   
Here, the MoocherHunter detected only a signal 
that was itself unauthorized, and as we have 
characterized it, likely illegal.  At the time Erdely used 
the MoocherHunter, Stanley was connecting to the 
Neighbor’s router without his knowledge or consent.  
 20 
 
Without that contemporaneous unauthorized connection, 
the MoocherHunter would have been unable to function.  
And the MoocherHunter revealed only the path of the 
signal establishing this connection.  It revealed nothing 
about the content of the data carried by that signal.  
Accordingly, Stanley’s privacy expectations concerning 
the path of his unauthorized signal are “categorically 
distinguishable” from expectations he would have had 
concerning the path of a lawful, legitimate signal.  
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
B. 
 
While we conclude that Stanley lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the path of his 
unauthorized signal, we believe the able District Judge 
went too far when she held that “Stanley exposed his 
signal to a third party and assumed the risk that the signal 
would be revealed to the authorities.”  J.A. 23.  Other 
district courts have embraced this theory as well.  See 
Norris, 2013 WL 4737197 at *7–8; Broadhurst, 2012 
WL 5985615 at *5.  Because of that, we believe it 
appropriate to address why we consider this a flawed 
approach.
15
 
                                                 
15
  Because we hold that Stanley lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, Judge Shwartz finds it unnecessary to 
discuss the third-party doctrine and Smith v. Maryland.  In 
addition, Judge Shwartz has a different view concerning the 
doctrine’s applicability to the facts of this case.  From her 
 21 
 
In Smith, a robbery victim told police that she was 
receiving harassing phone calls from a man identifying 
himself as the robber.  442 U.S. at 737.  Suspecting this 
man to be Michael Smith, police asked Smith’s telephone 
company to install a pen register that would record the 
phone numbers he dialed from his home phone.  Id.  
When the register confirmed that Smith had dialed the 
victim’s number, police obtained a search warrant for his 
home and discovered additional incriminating evidence.  
Id.  After he was indicted, Smith moved to suppress this 
evidence on the basis that police officers conducted an 
unconstitutional warrantless search.  Id.   
                                                                                                             
perspective, even though Stanley’s transmissions to the 
Neighbor’s router did not specifically disclose his location, he 
voluntarily disclosed information to surreptitiously obtain his 
neighbor’s internet service that his neighbor could use to find 
him.  A cybertrespasser like Stanley assumes the risk that his 
neighbor (the trespassed upon party) would take steps to 
discover his whereabouts and share whatever clues he has 
with the police, including those that provide a link that leads 
to his location.  Like a footprint, the information that Stanley 
conveyed to the neighbor’s router may not in and of itself 
disclose his location, but it did provide a lead and by leaving 
it behind, Stanley assumed the risk it would be pursued.  
Thus, to the extent it is necessary to discuss the third-party 
doctrine, Judge Shwartz would conclude that, on the facts of 
this case, it provides another ground on which to affirm the 
District Court’s ruling that the use of the MoocherHunter here 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
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In upholding Smith’s conviction, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that it “consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties” 
because that person “assume[s] the risk” that this third 
party will convey this information to the police.  Id. at 
743–44 (internal citations omitted).  As an example, the 
Court cited its prior holding that “a bank depositor has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in financial information 
voluntarily conveyed to banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”  Id. at 744 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
Court then explained that “[w]hen he used his phone, 
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to 
the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to 
its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”  Id. at 
744.  Accordingly, “petitioner assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”  
Id.   
 
In Stanley’s case, the District Court held that 
“[b]ased upon Smith’s rationale, . . . Stanley did not have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the wireless signal 
he caused to emanate from his computer to the 
Kowikowski wireless router.”  J.A. 20.  The District 
Court explained: 
The information logged on that wireless 
router was accessible to [the Neighbor] and 
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through his consent, to Erdely.  This 
information showed the private IP address of 
Stanley’s computer.  Stanley, therefore, 
could have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the signal he was sending to or 
receiving from [the Neighbor]’s wireless 
router in order to connect to the internet. 
 
J.A. 21.  Accordingly, the District Court held that 
“Stanley exposed his wireless signal to a third party and 
assumed the risk that the signal would be revealed to the 
authorities.”  J.A. 23. 
 
We regard the District Court’s reasoning as flawed 
because Stanley’s wireless signal was not itself 
“information” that could be “conveyed” to authorities.  
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.  Rather, his wireless signal was 
composed of radio waves that were associated with a 
plethora of information, some of which the Neighbor 
could convey to authorities, but most of which he could 
not.  Specifically, Stanley, through transmission of his 
wireless signal, disclosed to the Neighbor his MAC 
address, his private IP address, and the fact that his 
wireless card was communicating with Stanley’s router at 
particular points in time.  Stanley, therefore, assumed the 
risk that the Neighbor would convey this information to 
Erdely. 
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Erdely, however, did not simply take this 
information to a magistrate and obtain a search warrant.  
Rather, Erdely used this information to conduct an 
additional investigative step that revealed additional 
information.  Specifically, Erdely entered Stanley’s MAC 
address into a sense-enhancing device, which he then 
used to obtain additional information about the strength 
of Stanley’s signal at different physical locations.  It was 
this additional information that Erdely used to obtain a 
warrant for Stanley’s home.  Yet Stanley did not “assume 
the risk” that the Neighbor would divulge this 
information because the Neighbor never possessed it.  
And if the Neighbor had possessed it, Erdely would not 
have needed the MoocherHunter in the first place.
16
 
 
Were we to hold that Stanley exposed his “signal” 
under Smith by transmitting it to a third-party router, we 
might open a veritable Pandora’s Box of Internet-related 
                                                 
16
  The District Court also appears to have erroneously 
equated Stanley’s wireless signal with the private IP address 
assigned to that signal.  See J.A. 21 (“An internet subscriber 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP 
address . . . , and likewise, a person connecting to another 
person’s wireless router does not have an expectation of 
privacy in that connection, i.e. the private IP address, when it 
is available to that third person and anyone with whom that 
person shares the information.”).  Just as a home is more than 
the address assigned to it, a wireless signal, as discussed 
above, is more than just its private IP address. 
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privacy concerns.  The Internet, by its very nature, 
requires all users to transmit their signals to third parties.  
Even a person who subscribes to a lawful, legitimate 
Internet connection necessarily transmits her signal to a 
modem and/or servers owned by third parties.  This 
signal carries with it an abundance of detailed, private 
information about that user’s Internet activity.  A holding 
that an Internet user discloses her “signal” every time it is 
routed through third-party equipment could, without 
adequate qualification, unintentionally provide the 
government unfettered access to this mass of private 
information without requiring its agents to obtain a 
warrant.  We doubt the wisdom of such a sweeping 
ruling, and in any event, find it unnecessary to embrace 
its reasoning.   
V. 
 We conclude that Stanley lacked a reasonable, 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the wireless signal.  
While Stanley is neither sheltered by Kyllo nor defeated 
by Smith, the unauthorized nature of his connection to the 
Neighbor’s router eliminates the possibility that society 
would recognize his privacy expectations as legitimate.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District  
Court.
